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THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Third Edition). By Hugo Adam
Bedau. New York: Oxford University Press. 1982. Pp. xiii, 424.
$29.95.
During the sixteen years since Hugo Adam Bedau published his second
edition of The .Death Penalty in America, 1 the Supreme Court has handed
down its most important decisions on the issue of capital punishment.
First, in the landmark 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia,2 a majority of the
Court held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid the application of death penalty statutes that leave jurors with undirected discretion in
sentencing.3 Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, 4 the Justices clarified
Furman and upheld the constitutionality of statutes that carefully guide
both judges and juries in imposing the death penalty rationally and according to uniform standards. These cases are merely the tip of the iceberg.
Recent opinions in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 5 Woodson v. North Carolina, 6
and Coker v. Georgia 7 have spoken to such important matters as deathscrupled jurors, mandatory death penalties, and capital punishment for
rape.
In light of this Supreme Court activity and the accompanying spate of
scholarly commentary on the subject, it comes as no surprise that Professor
Bedau has once again revised and updated his authoritative study. At first
glance, The .Death Penalty in America appears to be a cyclopedia of data
and opinion on capital punishment. Unlike the typical anthology in which
the essays stand largely apart, related by little more than their common
subject matter, however, this anthology is much more than the sum of its
parts. Each selection and group of selections is part of a grand scheme, and
the hand of Bedau is evident throughout.
In his preface, Bedau reiterates the cautionary (and understated) passage from an earlier edition, " 'that the idea of this book was not conceived
in dispassionate scholarly curiosity' " (p. viii). Although he has "tried to
walk a narrow line between misrepresenting [his] own abolitionist convictions and allowing them to interfere with the presentation and evaluation of
evidence and the views of others" (p. vii), Bedau is unmistakably an advoI. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (H. Bedau rev. ed. 1967).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. Furman was a 5-4 per curiam decision with each Justice writing !! separate opinion;
consequently, the Court failed to establish a uniform standard for death penalty statutes. Accordingly, in the wake of Furman, states enacted two types of death penalty statutes - those
providing for mandatory capital punishment and those guiding judges and jury discretion.
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The same day the Court decided Gregg, it handed down similar
verdicts in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
5. 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (capital defendants may not be tried by juries that exclude jurors
with scruples against capital punishment).
6. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding mandatory death penalty statutes unconstitutional). See
also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding mandatory death penalty statutes for
murdering police officers unconstitutional).
7. 433 U.S. 485 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is excessive punishment for rape).
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cate, and The Death Penalty in America is a systematic and persuasive presentation of the issues from the abolitionist perspective. 8
Bedau's inclinations are evident in the first chapter, ''Background and
Developments." His historical perspective is premised on the belief that
nearly "every reduction in the use of penal execution" is attributable to the
ongoing efforts of abolitionists (p. 3). Moreover, Bedau concludes that the
death penalty is "an anachronism, a vestigial survivor of an era when the
possibilities of incarcerative or rehabilitative penology were hardly
imagined, and equal respect for all persons convicted of crimes was a requirement unknown to our constitutional law" (p. 28). The resurgence of
capital punishment in the United States today, 9 however, belies this notion
that the evolution of sentencing guidelines and procedural safeguards signals a trend toward abolition, rather than refinement of the penalty. Indeed, the progression from Furman to Gregg also raises doubt as to the
contemporary relevance of Bedau's historical argument. 10
Like chapter one, chapter two presents a background of sorts - a comprehensive survey of data covering "three categories of basic legal and social facts" (p. 29), including capital punishment statutes, crime statistics,
and sentencing and execution figures. Constituted almost exclusively of
charts and tables, this section exemplifies the prominence of empirics in
formulating and assessing policy arguments. 11
In chapter three, "American Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty,"
Bedau starts putting this body of data to practical use. He acknowledges in
the first sentence of his Introduction to the chapter that "[s]ince the late
1960s, according to every available measure, the American public has professed support for capital punishment by a majority of more than two to
one" (p. 65). The selections that follow largely attempt to reconcile these
attitudes with the abolitionist position. Thus, Bedau states that the "Mar8. For a comprehensive bibliography of Bedau's writings on capital punishment, see pp.
387-88.
9. Other states seem anxious to get in step. Two weeks after Brooks was executed,
Massachusetts became the 38th state with a death penalty on the books, and Oregon
seems likely to become the 39th, 20 years after capital punishment was abolished there by
popular vote.
The national death-row population today is 1,137. That is 200 more than a year ago,
twice as many as in 1979, and larger, moreover, than ever before.
Anderson, An Eye for an Eye, TIME, Jan 24, 1983, at 28.
10. Furman, in holding unconstitutional death penalty statutes that provide for undirected
discretion in sentencing, left open the possibility that capital punishment inherently violates
the eighth amendment. In fact, Justices Brennan and Marshall, in their separate concurrences,
found the death penalty unconstitutional per se. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305,
359 (1972).
Gregg, Woodson and the like, therefore, must be viewed as instances of "fine-tuning" rather
than as steps toward abolition. See notes 4, 6 supra and accompanying text.
11. According to Bedau's grand scheme:
the reader will be presented first with the incontrovertible data drawn largely from government sources and opinion polls; then progressively more evaluative studies of controversies over deterrence and the administration of criminal justice will be reviewed; this is
followed by an examination of how the Supreme Court has viewed the constitutionality of
the death penalty; and only after all this are the forthright partisans on both sides allowed
to plead their case.
P. vi.
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shall hypothesis" 12 - that the public is uninformed about the death penalty
and would not support it were this ignorance remedied - "has been tested
and confirmed" (p. 66). He cites Sarat and Vidmar's 1976 article 13 as support for this proposition; however, the slightly earlier report by Vidmar and
Ellsworth, reprinted in this chapter, is much more cautious and equivocal
on the point (pp. 80-83). Moreover, whereas Bedau talces great pains to
undermine the significance of public support for capital punishment (pp.
66-68), Vidmar and Ellsworth counter that general expressions of opposition to capital punishment are similarly vulnerable to questioning directed
at specific, unsavory circumstances (pp. 83-84).
Chapter four addresses the question of deterrence. As Bedau notes, no
issue in the death penalty debate has been "more hotly contested" (p. 93).
Once again, his abolitionist advocacy is evident in the selection of articles in
this chapter. The most controversial group of studies in this area is that of
economist Isaac Ehrlich, the first investigator to report a finding that the
imposition of the death penalty measurably reduced the incidence of homicide.14 Although the three selections in the chapter by Gibbs; Zeise!; and
Klein, Forst, and Filatov are preoccupied in whole or in part with refuting
Ehrlich's methodology and data, Bedau, perhaps somewhat unfairly, chose
not to reprint either Ehrlich's initial report or his various defenses of it. 15
The remaining articles in the chapter examine deterrence in specific circumstances - prison murder, recidivism, and terrorism. Thornton's article
on "Terrorism and the Death Penalty" is perhaps the least satisfactory of
the volume. In response to a New York Times column suggesting that capital punishment be imposed upon convicted terrorists, Thornton isolates an
unusual example of deterrence as a prime motive of the proposed penalty.
Specifically, he posits that executing captured terrorists makes it less likely
that other like-minded terrorists will try to effect their comrades' release by
talcing hostages (p. 181). From that point of departure, the article's speculations on the reactions and motivations of terrorists "smell of the lamp" and
verge on absurdity.
Chapter five concerns the fallibility of administering the death penalty.
Described by Charles Black, Jr. as "processual" problems, vagaries in the
administration of the death penalty intrude in a number of ways - through
racism, capriciousness, ineffectiveness of counsel, and errors in fact-finding.
The chapter is highlighted by perhaps the best selection in the book, Ram12. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360-69 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
13. Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing
the Marshall Hypothesis, 1916 Wis. L. REV. 471. The authors reported that "when exposed to
information about capital punishment, ... a substantial proportion of the subjects altered
their opinions toward it." Id at 195. Their evaluation of this result, however, was much less
conclusory than that ascribed to it by Bedau. They merely suggested caution in accepting
generalized statements concerning public opinion in support of the death penalty, id at 195,
196, not that informed public opinion would necessarily shift to the abolitionist position.
14. His findings were reported initially in Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punis/1ment: A Question of L!fe and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 397 (1975). A full bibliography of
Ehrlich's work in this area appears in the references at the end of The Death Penalty in
America. P. 392.
15. It is not intended to suggest that the critiques of Ehrlich's findings are unpersuasive;
rather, the point is that all the selections included in the chapter represent the abolitionist view.
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sey Clark's "Spenkelink's Last Appeal," a sobering account of the events
immediately preceding the execution of John Spenkelink. This account
demonstrates that, despite the impression created that six years of appeals
are inordinately protective of a condemned prisoner's rights, 16 the judicial
system is still capable of throwing due process to the winds. Bedau cautions
in his Preface that, because of space limitations and publication in previous
editions, case histories were omitted from this volume. It is indeed fortunate, however, that the story of "Spenkelink's Last Appeal" was included,
for it is at least as persuasive as the clearest tables, most meticulous data, or
best reasoned hypotheses presented elsewhere in the book.
The .Death Penalty in America culminates in chapters seven and eight
with, respectively, five essays supporting and five opposing capital punishment. Bedau's pique toward retentionists surfaces briefly here. He notes in
a slightly disparaging tone that the "distinction" of having "devoted a
whole book solely to arguing the case for executions" belongs to Walter
Berns (p. 307), while, in contrast, he shows considerably more respect for a
similar effort asserting the abolitionist position by Charles L. Black, Jr. (p.
343). In fact, the excerpt, ''The Morality of Anger," from Berns' book, is by
far the most eloquent and thought provoking of those on behalf of the
death penalty. Berns suggests that capital punishment, by holding men responsible for the gravity of their acts, is an affirmation rather than a denial
of their humanity. He does not deny the pain that imposition of the death
penalty inflicts upon society itself. Rather, he characterizes it as a sacrifice
that is ennobling, not dehumanizing, of society (pp. 334-41).
A comparison of articles by Ernest van den Haag supporting the death
penalty and Anthony Amsterdam opposing it demonstrates that the logic of
arguments based upon utilitarian issues such as deterrence will support
either viewpoint. Thus, van den Haag argues that the irrevocability of the
death of homicide victims justifies capital punishment until deterrence is
positively disproved (pp. 325-26), while Amsterdam argues that the irrevocability of execution should place the burden of proof of deterrence on the
retentionists (p. 349). Retentionists refute data demonstrating nondeterrence with anecdotal examples, 17 while abolitionists counter by citing to
16. Justice Rehnquist's dissent from denial of an emergency review of a stay of Spenkelink's execution is illustrative of this attitude:
Justice Rehnquist wrote that his "difficulty undoubtedly stems from six years of litigation." He said continuing appeals could "result in a situation where States are powerless
to carry out a death sentence"; he was also critical of the defense's new contention that
Spenkelink had not had effective counsel. Justice Rehnquist found it hard to believe that
the defendant had suddenly determined this after six years of trial: "Either he does not
believe the claim himself or he had held the claim in reserve, an insurance policy of sorts,
to spring on a Federal judge of his choice if all else fails."
Pp. 229-30. Clark's response to this charge is: ". . . Mr. Rehnquist decides issues of fact
without the -evidence when a man's life is at stake." P. 230.
17. The examples offered in the Senate Judiciary Report, reprinted in chapter seven, at pp.
312-14, are typical. The report seems to contradict itself, however, on the deterrence issue, for
it later speaks of limiting capital punishment to "incorrigibly anti-social" individuals, "a minute class of extremely dangerous persons" (p. 315). Obviously, this "minute class" consists of
individuals least likely to be deterred from violent acts by any punishment. See also Adler,
Death Specialists: Florida's Zealous Prosecutors, AM. LAW., Sept. 1981, at 36 ("Five minutes
into a conversation on capital punishment, Georgieff [George Georgieff, head of state attorney
general's criminal appeals division] volunteers how he became convinced that the death pen-
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homicides motivated by the existence of the death penalty (e.g., Amsterdam
at p. 357). Finally, while van den Haag contends that capricious application of the death sentence is a "sham argument" because abolitionists
would oppose the death penalty even if this problem were overcome (p.
324), the same argument can be made by both sides with respect to all utilitarian issues. 18
Berns' views seem more formidable because they go beyond utilitarian
questions to the ultimate morality - the rightness or wrongness - of capital punishment. Since several essays in Bedau's earlier revised edition argue aspects of this most fundamental issue, it is unfortunate and somewhat
disappointing that Bedau chose not to include any of these materials in the
third edition. 19 Instead, Bedau has included in chapter six over fifty pages
of edited opinions from the Furman line of capital punishment cases.
While the cases lend an impression of comp;ehensiveness to the volume,
they are readily available elsewhere and could have been summarized
much more briefly. Moreover, the reader is unlikely to refer to Bedau's earlier edition, given the vast changes in empirical and legal standards since its
publication in 1967. The space taken by chapter six, therefore, might better
have been allotted to excerpts like those of Walter Berns or Sidney Hook,
Jacques Barzun, and Israel Kazis from the earlier revised edition.
Despite these shortcomings, however, The .Death Penalty in America is a
valuable and impressive compilation and, in its collective force, a persuasive document for the abolition of capital punishment. Perhaps, sixteen
years hence, changing circumstances and attitudes as well as new developments in case law and commentary will necessitate a fourth edition, but
until then Professor Bedau's most recent work will serve nicely as both a
reference and a primer on the death penalty.

alty serves its intended purpose: 'I know it's a deterrent because many years ago I was having
a spat, a physical fight, with one ofmy ex-wives, and I found myself choking her, and I saw her
eyes start to pop out, and suddenly off to the left or the right I saw the electric chair. It
deterred me.' ").
18. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note I, at 36 (''To diehard proponents of the death penalty,
deterrence hardly matters anyway. Declares [William F.] Buckley: 'If it could be absolutely
determined that there was no deterrent factor, I'd still be in favor of capital punishment.'").
19. Because the revised edition was pre-Furman and much of the empirical data now avail•
able did not exist, the advocates in that volume devote somewhat more attention to the fundamental question of the morality of the death penalty.

